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On the Recognizability of Money 
 
by Richard Dutu, Ed Nosal and Guillaume Rocheteau 
 
This paper develops a model of currency circulation under asymmetric information. 
Agents are heterogeneous and trade in bilateral matches. Coins are intrinsically valuable 
and are available in two weights, light and heavy. We characterize the equilibrium under 
complete information and under imperfect information about the quality of coins. We deter- 
mine a set of conditions under which the two currencies circulate and are traded according 
to di¤erent terms of trade. We study how output, welfare, and the velocity of currency are 
a¤ected by the recognizability of coins. We show that society.s welfare increases as coins 
become more easily recognizable. 
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 ￿He who had more Goods that he had used for, would choose to barter them for
Silver, though he had no use for it; Because, Silver was certain in its Quality￿ .
John Law, Money and Trade Considered with a Proposal for Supplying the
Nation with Money, 1705, p.7.
It has long been argued that recognizability is a desirable property for a medium of exchange.
In the above quotation, John Law makes precisely this point: Silver was used as a medium of
exchange because its value was readily known or recognizable. More than a century later,
Jevons (1875) reiterated the importance of recognizability, or what he calls cognizability, as one
property that money should possess:
￿As a medium of exchange, money has to be continually handed about, and it will
occasion great trouble if every person receiving currency has to scrutinize, weigh, and
test it. If it requires any skill to discriminate good money from bad, poor ignorant
people are sure to be imposed upon￿(Stanley Jevons, Money and the Mechanism of
Exchange, 1875, p. 40).1
More recently, Brunner and Meltzer (1971) and Alchian (1977) have argued that a widely
recognizable object￿ money￿ may emerge in trade as an attempt to reduce the transaction costs
associated with asymmetries of information. In particular, when trading with a recognizable
medium of exchange, individuals do not have to spend real resources in order to assess the
quality of the object that they receive in exchange for the goods they sell.2
In practice, however, assessing the intrinsic value of money was, and still may be, prob-
lematic. The quantity and quality of precious metal contained in coins are always subject to
uncertainty. First, the technology for making coins was little changed from ancient Greece until
the 16th century. Coins were struck by hand, using a hammer, trussel, and pile, which produced
1Jevons (1875) de￿ned cognizability as the property of a substance for being easily recognized and distinguished
from all other substances. He identi￿ed six other important properties of money: utility and value, portability,
indestructibility, homogeneity, divisibility, and stability of value.
2Williamson and Wright (1994) formalized the idea that money may be an e¢ cient response to asymmetric
information regarding the quality of goods. See King and Plosser (1986), Bernhardt and Engineer (1991), and
Berentsen and Rocheteau (2004) for other models in this vein.
2imperfect coins of varying size, weight, and ￿neness. To make matters worse, institutions asso-
ciated with metallic monetary systems could amplify the uncertainty associated with the true
value of coins. There are a number of examples from history. The way in which quality was
measured in medieval France encouraged mint masters to produce lighter coins than that the
authorities prescribed and to pocket the di⁄erence.3 It was also in the sovereign￿ s interest to
(secretly) lower the intrinsic content of coins as a way to increase seigniorage revenue. Although
professionals￿ such as moneychangers and bullion dealers￿ would not be fooled for very long,
lowering the intrinsic value of some coins would increase the uncertainty associated with the
medium of exchange among nonexperts. Clipping was another source of discrepancies between
two coins bearing the same imprint. Before the invention of the milled coin at the end of the
17th century, agents could make a pro￿t by clipping the edges of coins and minting the clippings
into new coins. This kind of operation could be very lucrative and was di¢ cult for authorities
to control or prevent. The consequences of clipping before the 1696 Great Recoinage in Britain
have been well documented by British historian Thomas Macaulay, who reported that, because
of the bad state of the coins, ￿nothing could be purchased without a dispute. Over every counter
there was wrangling from morning to night￿(Macaulay, 1855, p. 187).4 All these examples
suggest that uncertainty about the quality of coins may have a negative impact on trade and,
consequently, welfare.
In this paper we investigate how the recognizability of the object that serves as a medium
3Weight could be accurately determined using precise scales. Fineness was harder to verify and required proof
by using ￿re or a touchstone. The touchstone test consisted in rubbing a coin on a special stone and comparing
the color of the trace left with that of coins of known ￿neness. Assay by ￿re entailed melting down the coins in
order to separate gold or silver from less precious metals like copper, and to weight the resulting quantity. All
these operations were costly because of the expertise and tools required. See Gandall and Sussman (1997) for
a detailed description of the monitoring scheme employed by the French crown to supervise mint masters. For
the period 1385￿ 1410, Gandall and Sussman (1997) calculate that a mint master￿ s expected gain from fraud on
weight amounted to 11 percent of his net income when striking silver and 66 percent when striking gold. The
expected gain from fraud on ￿neness increased to 100 percent for silver and 600 percent for gold.
4Macaulay (1855, p.186) recounted the following story about clipping: ￿There was, indeed, some northern
districts into which the clipped money had only begun to ￿nd its way. An honest Quaker, who lived in one of
these districts, recorded (...) the amazement with which, when he travelled southward, shopkeepers and innkeepers
stared at the broad and heavy halfcrowns with which he paid his way. They asked whence he came, and where
such money was to be found. The guinea which he purchased for twenty-two shillings at Lancaster bore a di⁄erent
value at every stage of his journey. When he reached London it was worth thirty shillings.￿
3of exchange matters for output, welfare and the functioning of markets. To do so, we develop
a model of commodity money where a standard double-coincidence-of wants problem generates
a need for a medium of exchange. Consumption goods are perfectly recognizable, but coins
can be produced in di⁄erent qualities or weights, and assessing their quality or weight may be
di¢ cult. Owing to heterogeneity among agents, coins of di⁄erent weights￿ light and heavy￿
will be minted to promote e¢ cient exchanges. As in Sargent and Wallace (1983) and Sargent
and Smith (1997), agents have access to a minting and melting technology that enables them
to turn goods into coins and vice versa. Before going out shopping, agents must decide which
coin to mint. After their minting decision, buyers and sellers meet randomly and trade coins
for output.
We begin by studying a version of the model in which agents have full information about the
quality of the coins used in payment. We characterize the optimal denomination structure￿ i.e.,
the optimal weights of coins￿ and the composition and velocity of the money supply for this
economy. Taking as given this denomination structure, we then introduce imperfect information
about the medium of exchange. The nature of the information imperfection is that the seller
only learns with a probability of less than one the true value of the coin that is being o⁄ered
for trade. The terms of trade in a bilateral match are set by the buyer, who knows the true
value of the coin, and lotteries are allowed to trade indivisible coins.
We show the existence of various types of equilibria. We distinguish single-currency equi-
libria, where only one kind of coin circulates, from dual-currency equilibria, where two kinds
circulate. Within the class of dual-currency equilibria, an equilibrium may be separating or
pooling. In a pooling or by-tale equilibrium, two di⁄erent coins circulate but they trade at the
same terms. In a separating or by-weight equilibrium, two di⁄erent coins circulate and trade
at di⁄erent terms according to their intrinsic content. It may seem surprising that buyers with
coins whose di⁄erences are indistinguishable to the seller, can fully separate themselves in the
by-weight equilibrium. This separation can be explained as follows: Since buyers are making
take-it-or-leave-it o⁄ers, the bargaining game has the structure of a signaling game, i.e., buyers
make o⁄ers that signal the quality of their coins. In some equilibria, buyers with heavy coins
4can separate themselves from buyers with light coins by o⁄ering to trade their coins with a lower
probability for less output. In such equilibria, the velocity of heavy coins and the quantity they
buy are lower than light coins￿ . This velocity result hints at Gresham￿ s law: In particular, the
velocity of the more valuable coin is lower than that of the less valuable one.
We evaluate the e⁄ects of coins￿recognizability on output and welfare. When coins circulate
by weight, aggregate output and welfare increase with recognizability. When coins circulate by
tale, welfare increases with recognizability but aggregate output can either increase or decrease.
When the recognizability problem becomes severe, the dual-currency equilibria will cease to
exist. In that case, all buyers will mint light coins irrespective of their transaction needs. This
phenomenon also hints at Gresham￿ s law: In particular, bad (or less valuable) money drives
out good (or more valuable) money. We show that a decrease in the recognizability of coins
that triggers a transition from a dual-currency equilibrium to a single-currency equilibrium
necessarily reduces welfare.
There is a small literature on commodity money with imperfect information. Using the
Kiyotaki￿ Wright (1989) framework, Cuadras-Morato (1994) and Li (1995) study the endogenous
emergence of a medium of exchange when goods are subject to quality uncertainty. Haegler
(1997) shows that ￿at money can circulate alongside commodity money that is subject to
uncertainty and that it is welfare improving provided that the quantity of money is su¢ ciently
small. These paper mainly concern the emergence of a medium of exchange, while our paper
focuses on the determination of terms of trade in bilateral matches with asymmetric information.
Burdett, Trejos, and Wright (2001) and Velde, Weber, and Wright (1999) consider a related
environments where the terms of trade are endogenous. Here, our discussion highlights the
paper by Velde, Weber, and Wright (1999), which is the closest to our analysis. Velde, Weber,
and Wright (1999) consider an economy with two coins of di⁄erent weights and study the
typology of equilibria in terms of circulation-by-weight or circulation-by-tale. Their model
di⁄ers from what we do in several dimensions. In their environment, coins cannot be minted or
melted freely and agents cannot choose which coin to hold when going into the market: their
only decision is whether or not to spend a coin. Since we let buyers choose their portfolios, our
5model can be viewed as a commodity-money version of the model by Lagos and Wright (2005).
The fact that buyers choose which coin they hold increases the competition between currencies.
Also, we introduce heterogenous buyers so that it is optimal to have coins of di⁄erent weights.
Last, we allow agents to use lotteries to determine terms of trade. Such randomization devices
allow us to eliminate some equilibria and to uncover new ones. For instance, in our equilibrium
with circulation by weight, both coins are traded in uninformed matches for some output. In
contrast, in the by-weight equilibrium of Velde, Weber, and Wright, only light coins are traded
in uninformed matches, whereas heavy coins are hoarded. Also, in the standard speci￿cation
for the utility function adopted in search models, the equilibrium with circulation by tale would
not exist. Moreover, the availability of lotteries introduces a notion of divisibility which may
convey some information about the quality of coins. In particular, buyers can use lotteries
to send signals to sellers about the type of coin that they hold. Our by-weight equilibrium
is separating in that buyers￿o⁄ers fully reveal the coins they hold. Without lotteries, such
separation is not possible.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 1 presents the physical environment
of our model. Section 2 characterizes the benchmark economy with full information. Section 3
studies how imperfect information a⁄ects agents￿minting decisions. Section 4 focusses on the
consequences for output, welfare and velocity. Section 5 concludes.
1 The model
Time is discrete and goes on for two periods, t = 1;2.5 The economy is composed of a continuum
of agents of measure two, divided evenly between buyers and sellers. The set of buyers is denoted
B and the set of sellers is denoted S. Buyers are divided into two subgroups: a set BH of buyers
with measure ￿ have a high marginal utility of consumption; a set BL of buyers with measure
1 ￿ ￿ have a low marginal utility of consumption. There are three kinds of goods: a general
5Our two-period model is equivalent to an in￿nite-period horizon version: Since there are no state variables
that link the di⁄erent periods, there is no loss in generality by considering only two periods. Note also that our
model is essentially a commodity-money version of the Lagos and Wright (2005) framework.
6good that can be produced and consumed by all agents, a special good that is only consumed
by buyers and only produced by sellers, and coins. Both general and special goods are perfectly
divisible and perishable. In contrast, coins are perfectly durable and indivisible.
General goods can be turned into coins according to a perfectly reversible technology. For
simplicity, we suppose that there is no transaction cost associated with the minting and melting
processes.6 The minting technology allows for two types of coins: heavy coins that are made of
zh units of general goods and light coins that are made of z‘ < zh units of general goods. We
will sometimes refer to z as the weight of the coin. For tractability purposes, we will assume
that agents cannot carry more than one coin across periods.7
The sequence of events is as follows: At t = 1, agents can produce the general good and
have access to the minting technology. At t = 2, buyers and sellers are matched pairwise and
at random, where the special goods are produced in bilateral matches by the seller. Since there
is the same number of buyers and sellers, we assume that each buyer is randomly assigned to
a seller. At the end of the second period, bilateral matches are dissolved, agents melt any coin
that they possess, and consumption takes place.
The utility function of a buyer, Ub ("), is given by
Ub (") = c1 + ￿ ["u(q) + c2]; (1)
where ct is the net consumption of general goods in period t (if ct < 0 agents consume less
than they produce), q is the quantity of special goods consumed, ￿ 2 (0;1) is the discount
factor across periods, and " is a preference parameter where " = "L for buyers in BL and
" = "H > "L for buyers in BH. Note that general goods enter linearly in the utility function.
We denote r = ￿￿1￿1 as the agents￿rate of time preference. The function u(q) is continuously
di⁄erentiable, strictly increasing, and concave, and it satis￿es u(0) = 0 and u0(0) = 1.
6For a model where minting and melting are costly processes, see Sargent and Wallace (1983).
7This assumption is made to simplify the bargaining problem when there is imperfect information about the
quality of coins. In several parts of the analysis, we will choose the sizes of the coins to make this constraint
nonbinding.
7The utility function of a seller, Us, is given by
Us = c1 + ￿ [￿ (q) + c2]: (2)
The ￿cost￿function,  (q), is continuously di⁄erentiable, strictly increasing, and convex. Fur-
thermore,  (0) = 0,  0(0) = 0, and there exists a q￿
" < 1 such that "u0(q￿
") =  0(q￿
"). Output
q￿
" corresponds to the level of production that maximizes the total surplus in a match between
a seller and a buyer of type ".
The terms of trade in pairwise matches are determined by bargaining. For simplicity, we
assume that buyers make take-it-or-leave-it o⁄ers.
2 Equilibrium with complete information
In this section, we describe the equilibrium of the model when there is no information problem
about the weight of coins. We ￿rst describe the determination of the terms of trade in bilateral
meetings. We assume that agents in a match have access to a randomization device that allows
them to bargain over lotteries. We allow lotteries because they lead to a Pareto improvement in
bilateral matches when coins are indivisible.8 We will also see that lotteries play an important
role in the presence of incomplete information. Since goods are divisible, agents only randomize
over the transfer of the coin.9 Denote (q;p) as the terms of trade, where q 2 R+ is the quantity
of the special good produced by the seller and consumed by the buyer, and p 2 [0;1] is the
probability that the buyer gives his coin to the seller. Suppose that the buyer holds a coin
of weight z, whereas the seller holds a coin of weight z0. Since buyers make take-it-or-leave-it
o⁄ers, the terms of trade, (q;p), are given by the solution to the following problem,
max
q￿0;p2[0;1]
"u(q) + (1 ￿ p)z (3)
s.t. ￿  (q) + p(z + z0) + (1 ￿ p)z0 ￿ z0; (4)
p ￿ 1:
8Lotteries in search models of money were introduced by Berentsen, Molico, and Wright (2002). Berentsen
and Rocheteau (2002) discuss ine¢ ciencies associated with indivisible money and compare models with lotteries
and models with divisible money.
9This result was established in Berentsen, Molico, and Wright (2002).
8The buyer chooses (q;p) in order to maximize his expected utility (3) subject to the seller￿ s
participation constraint (4). From (3) the expected utility of the buyer is the utility of con-
suming the special good, "u(q), plus the utility of consuming the general good embodied in the
coin, z, if it is not handed over to the seller, an event which occurs with probability 1￿p. The
left-hand side of (4) has a similar interpretation. The right-hand side of (4) is the utility of
the seller from consuming the general good embodied in his coin if the buyer￿ s o⁄er is rejected.
Problem (3)￿ (4) can be simpli￿ed to read
max
q;p￿1
"u(q) ￿ pz s.t. ￿  (q) + pz ￿ 0: (5)
It is clear from (5) that the terms of trade (q;p) do not depend on the coin held by the seller,



















If the buyer￿ s coin has insu¢ cient value to purchase the e¢ cient level of output, i.e., if z < z￿
" ￿
  (q￿
"), then he gives his coin to the seller with probability one in exchange for as much output
as his coin can purchase, which is equal to  ￿1(z); if, on the other hand, the buyer￿ s coin has a
value that exceeds the e¢ cient level of output, i.e., z ￿ z￿
" ￿   (q￿
"), then he will give the coin
to the seller with probability  (q￿
")=z in exchange for q￿
" units of output.
From (1), (6) and (7), the expected utility of a buyer in period 1 satis￿es
max
z2f0;z‘;zhg
￿z + ￿ fu[q(";z)] + [1 ￿ p(";z)]zg: (8)
According to (8), a buyer chooses which coin to mint, if any. The disutility of minting a coin
of weight z is z, where z 2 f0;z‘;zhg. In period 2, the buyer consumes q units of special goods,
where q depends on the weight z of his coin and the buyer hands over his coin to the seller with




f￿rz + "u[q(";z)] ￿  [q(";z)]g: (9)
9Problem (9) has a simple interpretation. The buyer chooses a coin that maximizes his surplus
in a bilateral match, "u ￿  , net of the (opportunity) cost of holding a coin, rz.





￿ [q(";zb)] + p(";zb)zb + z
o
dF(";zb); (10)
where F(zb;") is the distribution of buyers indexed by their type, ", and the coin that they
hold, zb, where (zb;") 2 f0;z‘;zhg ￿ f"L;"Hg. The interpretation of (10) is analogous to that











Since the integral in (11) does not depend on the seller￿ s coin, the seller￿ s optimal choice of the
coin is z = 0. The intuition for this result is straightforward: The utility of consuming general
goods is linear, so there is no smoothing motive for holding coins; and the bargaining outcome
is independent of the seller￿ s coin holdings, so there is no strategic motive for holding coins.
We are now in a position to de￿ne and characterize the equilibrium to the economy under
complete information.




such that zi 2 f0;z‘;zhg is solution
to (9) with " = "L for all i 2 BL, and zj 2 f0;z‘;zhg is solution to (9) with " = "H for all
j 2 BH.
Proposition 2 An equilibrium exists and it is generically unique.
Proof. The function in (9) is maximized over a ￿nite set. Therefore, a solution exists. Denote
~ z" = max
z2R+
f￿rz + "u[q(";z)] ￿  [q(";z)]g:
The function in (9) is strictly increasing for all z 2 (0; ~ z") and is strictly decreasing for all
z > ~ z". Therefore, the function in (9) cannot take the same value for more than two distinct
10values for z. So the solution to (9) is unique except for a set of parameter values of measure 0,
in which case the problem in (9) admits two solutions.
Figure 1 shows the payo⁄ for an "-type buyer, ￿rz + "u[q (";z)] ￿   [q (";z)], as a function
of the weight z of the coin that he is holding. The variable ~ z" denotes an "-buyer￿ s optimal
weight of coin, or his ideal coin, assuming there is no restriction on the weight of the coin that
can be minted. The buyer￿ s payo⁄ is maximized at z = ~ z". The weight that maximizes the
surplus of a match is given by z￿
", and the maximum weight that an "-type buyer is willing to
hold is given by ￿ z". This means that ￿ z" is the critical value for the weight of a coin for an "
buyer, above which the buyer has no incentive to hold a coin, i.e., the coin is ￿too heavy￿This
critical value is given implicitly by r￿ z" = "u[q(￿ z")] ￿  [q(￿ z")]. Figure 1 depicts the (unlikely)
situation in which z‘ < ~ z" < zh and the buyer is indi⁄erent between holding the heavy and
light coin.
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Figure 1: Buyer￿ s payo⁄.
For arbitrary coins z‘ and zh, one can show that there are two thresholds "0 > 0 and "1 > "0
such that: if " < "0, then an "￿buyer holds no coin; if " 2 ("0;"1), then an "￿buyer holds a
light coin; and if " > "1, then an "￿buyer holds a heavy coin. The next lemma characterizes
the ideal coin of a buyer.
11Lemma 3 The weight of the ideal coin of an " buyer is ~ z" that satis￿es
"u0[ ￿1(~ z")]
 0[ ￿1(~ z")]
= 1 + r: (12)
Proof. ~ z" is solution to (9) when z 2 R+. The ￿rst-order condition to problem (9) is ￿r +
"u0q0 ￿  0q0 = 0, where q0 = @q=@z. For all z > z￿
", q0(z;") = 0. Therefore, z ￿ z￿
" and p = 1.
From (6), q0(";z) = 1= 0[q(";z)]. Substituting this into the above ￿rst-order condition and
rearranging, we obtain equation (12).
Note from (12) that the weight of the ideal coin decreases with the rate of time preference,
r, which is the opportunity cost of holding a coin.10
We will assume throughout the remainder of the paper that the minting technology is
such that the weight of the coins is the ideal weights for each type of buyer; that is, we will
assume that zh ￿ ~ zh, which is the ideal coin for the high marginal-utility buyer, and z‘ ￿ ~ z‘,
which is the ideal coin for the low marginal-utility buyer, where ~ z" is solution to (12). In
the absence of asymmetries of information, the equilibrium outcome is characterized by all
low (marginal-utility) buyers minting light coins and all high (marginal-utility) buyers minting









, which the seller accepts. At the end of period 2, the seller consumes either zh or
z‘, depending upon whether he produced for the high or low buyer. For convenience, we will
denote  ￿1 (zh) ￿ qh and  ￿1 (z‘) ￿ q‘.
3 Equilibrium with asymmetric information
We now consider how equilibrium outcomes are a⁄ected when information about the weight
(or quality) of coins is imperfect. We capture the notion of imperfect information by appealing
to the information structure used in Williamson and Wright (1994): In any match, the seller
receives a common-knowledge signal regarding the weight of the coin held by the buyer. With
10Note that the equation for ~ z is the same as the equation for the choice of real balances in the Lagos￿ Wright
model. Also, it is equivalent to the choice of capital goods under the assumption of a linear storage technology
in the model by Lagos and Rocheteau (2004).
12probability ￿ 2 (0;1), the signal is informative and the weight of the coin is revealed to the seller;
with probability 1￿￿, the signal is uninformative. The parameter ￿ captures the extent of the
informational asymmetries. Also, the buyer￿ s preference parameter, ", is private information.
In matches where the seller is uninformed, the take-it-or-leave-it bargaining game has the
structure of a signaling game.11 The buyer makes an o⁄er (q;p) 2 R+ ￿ [0;1], and the seller
uses this o⁄er to update his prior belief about the weight of the coin held by the buyer.12 Let
￿(q;p) 2 [0;1] represent the updated belief of a seller that the coin held by the buyer is a heavy
coin conditional on the o⁄er (q;p). If (q;p) corresponds to an equilibrium o⁄er, then ￿(q;p) is
derived from the seller￿ s prior belief, according to Bayes￿rule. If (q;p) is an out-of-equilibrium
o⁄er, then Bayes￿rule cannot be applied and the seller￿ s belief is arbitrary.




"u(q) ￿ pz (13)
s.t. ￿  (q) + pf￿(q;p)zh + [1 ￿ ￿(q;p)]z‘g ￿ 0: (14)
The buyer chooses an o⁄er (q;p) that maximizes his surplus from the trade (13), subject to
the seller￿ s participation constraint (14). From (14), the buyer takes into account that his o⁄er
will a⁄ect the seller￿ s belief regarding the weight of his coin. We will restrict our attention to
equilibria such that whenever (14) holds with equality, the buyer￿ s o⁄er will be accepted with
probability one.
Let [qu(";z);pu(";z)] denote the o⁄er made by an "￿ type buyer holding a coin of weight
z in an uninformed match. We will restrict our attention to equilibria where all buyers of a
given type (";z) make the same o⁄er. We will call an equilibrium where qu("L;z‘) = qu("H;zh)
a by-tale (or pooling) equilibrium because in all uninformed trades a light coin buys as much
as a heavy coin, and an equilibrium where qu("L;z‘) 6= qu("H;zh) a by-weight (or separating)
equilibrium because coins will always trade according to their weight.
11For a formal description of a signaling game, see Cho and Kreps (1987).
12In contrast to a standard signaling game, the type of the buyer in our bargaining game is really (";z), which
is endogenous because buyers choose the weight of the coin they hold.
13The buyer￿ s choice of a coin, which modi￿es (9) in the obvious way, is now given by
max
z2f0;z‘;zhg
f￿rz + ￿f"u[q(";z)] ￿  [q(";z)]g + (1 ￿ ￿)["u[qu(";z)] ￿ pu(";z)z]g; (15)
where " = "H for high buyers and " = "L for low buyers. Because information may be imperfect
in the bargaining games, the previous de￿nition of an equilibrium must be modi￿ed.
De￿nition 4 An equilibrium is a list f(zi)i2BL, (zj)j2BH, [q(";z);p(";z);qu(";z)], pu(";z);
(";z) 2 f"H;"Lg ￿ fzh;z‘g), ￿(q;p)g such that:
1. zi is solution to (15) with " = "L for all i 2 BL, and zj is solution to (15) with " = "H
for all j 2 BH.
2. [q(";z);p(";z)] is given by (6)￿ (7) for all (";z) 2 f"H;"Lg ￿ fzh;z‘g.
3. [qu(";z);pu(";z)] is solution to (13)￿ (14) for all (";z) 2 f"H;"Lg ￿ fzh;z‘g.
4. The belief system ￿(q;p) is deduced from Bayes￿rule whenever possible.
A crucial element of the above de￿nition is the belief system ￿(q;p). Below, we will put more
structure on these beliefs by adopting a particular re￿nement. Before turning to the re￿nement,
we can establish that the existence of imperfect information does not a⁄ect the strategy of a
low buyer. In particular,
Lemma 5 In any equilibrium, a low buyer always mints a light coin.
Proof. See Appendix.
Intuitively, if imperfect information causes the value of a coin to deviate from its intrinsic
value, then the light coin will tend to be overvalued and the heavy coin will tend to be under-
valued. As well, the light coin is the ideal weight for low buyers in informed matches. These
observations imply that a low buyer will never have an incentive to mint a heavy coin. Since
in all equilibria the low buyer mints a light coin, a characterization of an equilibrium requires,
among other things, that we determine whether a high buyer mints a heavy coin or a light one.
14When bargaining with a seller, a buyer can attempt to signal the weight of his coin. But
signaling raises the thorny issue of how a seller should interpret an o⁄er that is not supposed
to occur in equilibrium. In this regard, we will restrict sellers￿out-of-equilibrium beliefs to be
consistent with the Cho￿ Kreps equilibrium re￿nement. The intuition behind this re￿nement
is as follows: Suppose that a seller receives the out-of-equilibrium o⁄er (^ q; ^ p). If o⁄er (^ q; ^ p)
reduces the utility of an " buyer who holds a coin that weighs z compared to his equilibrium
payo⁄, then, according to the Cho￿ Kreps criterion, the seller should assign a probability equal
to zero that this o⁄er came from an " buyer holding a coin that weighs z. The criterion allows
the seller to place a positive probability weight only on buyers who would bene￿t from having
the out-of-equilibrium o⁄er accepted.
The following proposition speci￿es the necessary conditions for a by-weight equilibrium and
a by-tale equilibrium to exist.
Proposition 6 Consider an equilibrium where high buyers hold heavy coins. If "L=z‘ > "H=zh,
then the outcome in uninformed matches is separating. If "L=z‘ < "H=zh, then the outcome in
uninformed matches cannot be separating.
Proof. See Appendix.
The condition "L=z‘ > "H=zh says something about relative marginal rates of substitution
between q and p for a high buyer with a heavy coin and a low buyer with a light coin. It
indicates that in order to obtain the same increase in consumption, a low buyer with a light
coin is willing to give up his coin with a higher probability than a high buyer with a heavy coin.
When this condition is satis￿ed, it is not possible to have a by-tale equilibrium. If a by-tale (or
pooling) allocation is proposed as an equilibrium, then a high buyer with a heavy coin could
instead o⁄er to trade his coin for a lower quantity of output and with a lower probability in a
way that makes him better o⁄ compared to the proposed equilibrium and, at the same time,
would make the low buyer with the light coin worse o⁄. This point is illustrated in ￿gure 2.
We denote Ub
L‘ = "Lu(q) ￿ pz‘ as the surplus that a low buyer holding a light coin receives
if the terms of trade are (q;p), and Ub
Hh = "Hu(q) ￿ pzh as the surplus that a high buyer
15holding a heavy coin receives. Consider a proposed pooling equilibrium where all buyers o⁄er
(qu;pu). Suppose that a high buyer defects from a proposed equilibrium play and instead o⁄ers
(^ qu; ^ pu), which lies to the right of Ub
Hh and to the left of Ub
L‘ in ￿gure 2. According to the
Cho￿ Kreps re￿nement, the seller should interpret this out-of-equilibrium o⁄er as coming from
a high buyer with a heavy coin. The seller will accept this o⁄er because it provides him with a
positive surplus, i.e., allocation (^ qu; ^ pu) lies above his reservation indi⁄erence curve Us
h, de￿ned
by ￿ (q) + pzh = 0. Therefore, if the two coins coexist, they will be traded at di⁄erent terms











Figure 2: Ruling out pooling equilibria ("L=z‘ > "H=zh).
If, on the other hand, "L=z‘ < "H=zh, then it is not possible to have a by-weight (separating)
equilibrium. If a separating allocation was proposed as an equilibrium, then the low buyer with
a light coin would make the full information o⁄er (q‘;1), since in a separating equilibrium the
buyer is revealed as being a low type with a light coin. However, when "L=z‘ < "H=zh; the
indi⁄erence curves for the buyers are ￿reversed￿compared to ￿gure 2, i.e., Ub
Hh is steeper than
Ub
L‘; which implies that the incentive-compatible o⁄er for the high buyer holding the heavy
coin that maximizes his surplus is given by (q‘;1). Hence, the equilibrium cannot be separating
and, in an equilibrium where both heavy and light coins circulate, they will circulate by tale.
16Because a by-tale equilibrium will turn out to be qualitatively equivalent to an equilibrium
where lotteries are not allowed, which have already been described in various papers (Velde,
Weber, and Wright (1999) and Burdett, Trejos, and Wright (2001)), we will focus most of our
attention on equilibria that features circulation by weight. These equilibria are of particular
interest because they allow for the possibility of signaling. Also, the required condition for
circulation by weight, "L=z‘ > "H=zh, will be satis￿ed for standard speci￿cations for utility and
cost functions (e.g., u(q) = qa, with a 2 (0;1) and  (q) = q).
3.1 By-weight circulation
In this section we will examine equilibria where circulation is by weight. We will ￿rst charac-
terize the set of by-weight equilibrium o⁄ers assuming that the high buyer mints a heavy coin
at date 1. In informed meetings, a buyer holding the heavy coin will make the o⁄er (qh;1),
and a buyer holding the light coin will make the o⁄er (q‘;1). The lemmas below describe what
happens in uninformed meetings.
Lemma 7 Assume "L=z‘ > "H=zh. In any equilibrium where high-type buyers hold heavy coins,
the low buyer will mint a light coin and will make the full information o⁄er,
[qu("L;z‘);pu("L;z‘)] = (q‘;1): (16)
The high buyer￿ s o⁄er maximizes his surplus
[qu("H;zh);pu("H;zh)] = arg max
q;p￿1
"Hu(q) ￿ pzh (17)
subject to the seller accepting and the low buyer not mimicking the o⁄er, i.e.,
￿ (q) + pzh ￿ 0 (18)
"Lu(q‘) ￿ z‘ ￿ "Lu(q) ￿ pz‘; (19)





The equilibrium o⁄er by a low buyer holding a light coin, (q‘;1), is represented in ￿gure 3
at the intersection of the participation constraint of the seller who believes that the buyer is
holding a light coin, Us
‘ = 0, and p = 1. The indi⁄erence curve of a low buyer holding a light
coin that goes through this point, Ub
L‘ = "Lu(q‘)￿z‘, represents the equilibrium surplus of the
low buyer. Given that the equilibrium is separating, i.e., by their o⁄ers the buyers essentially
reveal their type and the coin that they are holding, the low buyer holding the light coin can
do no better than he could in an informed match.
In contrast, signaling is costly for the high buyer holding a heavy coin, and his payo⁄ is
lower than what it would be in an informed match. The best o⁄er that a high buyer holding a
heavy coin can propose, (17), must (i) satisfy the participation constraint of seller who believes
that the buyer is holding a heavy coin, (18), and (ii) not be imitated by the low buyer holding
a light coin, (19). The seller￿ s participation constraint with an equality is depicted by Us
h in
￿gure 3, and the low buyer￿ s incentive-compatibility constraint with an equality is given by
Ub
L‘. It can be seen from ￿gure 3 that the solution to (17)￿ (19) is at the intersection of the
seller￿ s participation constraint, Us
h, and the low buyer￿ s incentive-compatibility constraint, Ub
L‘.
Notice that qu("H;zh) < qu("L;z‘) = q‘ and pu("H;zh) < pu ("L;z‘) = 1. In order to signal the
weight of his coin, the high buyer proposes an o⁄er with lower output and a lower probability
to deliver his coin, compared to the low buyer￿ s o⁄er.
The above lemma simply assumes that the high buyer will mint the heavy coin in date 1.
Will a high buyer have an incentive to mint the heavy coin? From (15), the high buyer will
mint a heavy coin if
￿rzh + ￿￿Hh + (1 ￿ ￿)￿u
Hh ￿ ￿rz‘ + ￿H‘; (20)
where ￿ji = "ju[q("j;zi)] ￿ p("j;zi)zi is the surplus of a buyer of type (j;i) in an informed
match with i 2 f‘;hg and j 2 fL;Hg. Similarly, ￿u
ji is the surplus of a buyer of type (j;i) in
an uninformed match, ￿u














Figure 3: Separating o⁄er.
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It can be demonstrated that 0 < ￿c < 1.13 As long as the information problem is not too
severe, high buyers will mint heavy coins and low buyers will mint light ones. The bene￿ts from
trading with heavy coins in informed matches outweigh the costs associated with signaling for
high buyers in uninformed matches.
Now let￿ s turn to single-currency equilibria in which high buyers mint light coins. In that
case, the following lemma describes the equilibrium o⁄ers that buyers make:
Lemma 8 Assume "L=z‘ > "H=zh. In any equilibrium where high-type buyers mint light coins,
[qu("H;z‘);pu("H;z‘)] = [qu("L;z‘);pu("L;z‘)] = (q‘;1):
13From (19), it can be checked that
￿
u















i.e., the surplus of a high-type buyer with a heavy coin in an uninformed meeting is lower than that of a high-type
buyer with a light coin. This guarantees that ￿c > 0.
19Furthermore, if buyers defect from equilibrium play and mint heavy coins, their (out-of-equilibrium)
o⁄ers satisfy [qu("H;zh);pu("H;zh)] = [qu("L;zh);pu("L;zh)], where [qu("H;zh);pu("H;zh)] is
given by the solution to (17)￿ (19).
Proof. See Appendix.
Intuitively, the above equilibrium o⁄er extracts all of the surplus from the seller, given that
the buyer￿ who is either high or low￿ is holding a light coin. A single-currency equilibrium will
exist only if the high-type buyer has an incentive to hold the light coin, and this will happen
only when ￿ is smaller than the threshold ￿c. One can also show that there is no single-currency
equilibrium for ￿ > ￿c.14 The following proposition summarizes the above discussion.
Proposition 9 Assume "L=z‘ > "H=zh. There exists a threshold ￿c such that: (i) If ￿ > ￿c,
then there can only exist a circulation by-weight equilibrium, in which both heavy and light coins
circulate; (ii) If ￿ ￿ ￿c, then there can only exist a single currency equilibrium where all buyers
hold light coins.
Proposition 9 shows that even though high buyers can separate themselves from low buyers,
there is a threshold for ￿ below which heavy coins are driven out of circulation. The reason a
high buyer would choose to mint a light coin is that when the information problem is severe,
the holder of a heavy coin incurs a large signaling cost by reducing his average consumption in
the second period. It is better for the high buyer to avoid these signaling costs by holding a
light coin.
3.2 By-tale circulation
In this section, we examine equilibria in which heavy and light coins buy exactly the same
amount of goods in uninformed matches. Since a pooling equilibrium is rather straightforward
14To see this, suppose that there exists an o⁄er [q
u("H;zh);p
u("H;zh)] for which a single-currency equilibrium
exists for ￿ > ￿c. In this case, [q
u("H;zh);p
u("H;zh)] does not satisfy (17)￿ (19); therefore, the surplus of a high
buyer with a heavy coin in an uninformed match is less than he would get if he made the o⁄er in (17)￿ (19). But
then a high buyer would have a pro￿table deviation by holding a heavy coin and making the o⁄er in (17)￿ (19).
Since ￿ > ￿c, the payo⁄ associated with this deviation dominates the equilibrium payo⁄ of a high buyer holding
a light coin; therefore, it should be attributed to a buyer with a heavy coin, from the Cho￿ Kreps re￿nement.
20to characterize, our treatment can be brief.
Circulation by tale requires, from proposition 6, that "L=z‘ < "H=zh and that the high
buyer has an incentive to mint a heavy coin at date 1. We will restrict our attention to what
we think is the natural by-tale equilibrium: one where all coins are traded with probability
one, i.e., pu("H;zh) = pu("L;z‘) = 1.15 The quantity traded in uninformed matches, qu, is not
uniquely determined, but it must satisfy the seller￿ s participation constraint,
 (qu) ￿ ￿zh + (1 ￿ ￿)z‘; (22)
and it must be at least as good as the o⁄er of a low buyer in an informed match, qu ￿ q‘. A
high buyer will have an incentive to mint a heavy coin if
￿rzh + ￿￿Hh + (1 ￿ ￿)["Hu(qu) ￿ zh] > ￿rz‘ + ￿￿H‘ + (1 ￿ ￿)["Hu(qu) ￿ z‘] (23)
or if
￿ > ￿ ￿ =
(1 + r)(zh ￿ z‘)
"Hu[q ("H;zh)] ￿ "Hu[q ("H;z‘)]
: (24)
As in the previous section, both heavy and light coins can co-circulate provided that the infor-
mation problem is not too severe; but unlike the previous section, heavy and light coins buy
exactly the same amount of the speci￿c good.
When the information problem does become severe, then￿ as in the previous section￿ high
buyers will choose to mint light coins. High buyers will, in fact, choose to mint light coins if
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿.16 The results of this section are conveniently summarized in the following proposition,
Proposition 10 Assume "L=z‘ < "H=zh. If ￿ > ￿ ￿ then there is an equilibrium with by-tale
circulation. A by-tale equilibrium is not unique; although both heavy and light coins will be
15If high buyers strictly prefer holding heavy coins to holding light ones, then the Cho￿ Kreps re￿nement
implies that p
u("H;zh) = p
u("L;z‘) = 1. We view this as being the ￿natural￿ equilibrium outcome because
p
u("H;zh) = p
u("L;z‘) < 1 is a knife-edge case in which the high buyer is just indi⁄erent between minting a
light and heavy coin.
16If a high buyer deviates from the single-currency equilibrium strategy of minting a light coin by mint-
ing a heavy coin, his best o⁄er is (q‘;1). Indeed, from the assumption "L=z‘ < "H=zh, U
b
Hh is steeper than
U
b
L‘ in the (q;p) space. Therefore, the best o⁄er that a high-type buyer with a heavy coin can make is
(q
u("L;z‘);p
u("L;z‘)) = (q‘;1). Hence, the high buyer￿ s equilibrium payo⁄ is given by the right-hand side
of (23), while the defection payo⁄ is given by the left-hand side of (23).
21traded with probability one, the output level is not pinned down. A single-currency equilibrium
exists if ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿.
Proposition 10 describes a Gresham￿ s-law type of phenomenon. The heavy and light coins
are traded at par in some matches because of asymmetries of information. As a consequence,
if the fraction of uninformed matches gets su¢ ciently large, then Gresham￿ s law is activated:
All buyers choose to mint light coins and heavy coins disappear from circulation.
4 Recognizability and welfare
We now consider various positive and normative aspects associated with the recognizability of
coins. We examine how recognizability a⁄ects output, welfare and the velocity of currency. We
de￿ne the velocity of coin i 2 f‘;hg, vi, as the average probability that the coin changes hands
in a bilateral match, i.e.,
vi = ￿pi + (1 ￿ ￿)pu
i ; (25)
where pi and pu
i are the probabilities that the coin of weight i changes hands in informed
and uninformed matches, respectively. We measure aggregate output, Y , as the sum of the
quantities traded in bilateral matches, i.e.,
Y =
Z
[￿q(";z) + (1 ￿ ￿)qu(";z)]dF(";z); (26)
where F(";z) is the distribution of buyers￿types (";z) 2 f"L;"Hg ￿ fz‘;zhg. Finally, social
welfare, W, is the sum of the utilities of all agents in the economy, i.e.,
W =
Z
Ub(";z)dF(";z) + Us; (27)
where Us is the expected utility of a seller and Ub(";z) is the expected utility of an " buyer who
mints a coin of weight z, and Ub(";z), satis￿es
￿￿1Ub(";z) = ￿rz + f￿["u[q(";z)] ￿ p(";z)z] + (1 ￿ ￿)["u[qu(";z)] ￿ pu(";z)z]g:
22Note that Us = 0 for all single-currency equilibria and for the dual-currency equilibria where
circulation is by weight. However, Us can di⁄er from zero in some equilibria with circulation
by tale.
We ￿rst describe the e⁄ects of a change in recognizability on the di⁄erent types of equilib-
ria previously studied (assuming this change does not put the economy in a di⁄erent type of
equilibrium). We then investigate the e⁄ects of a change in recognizability that triggers a tran-
sition from a dual-currency equilibrium to a single-currency equilibrium on output, welfare, and
velocity. Finally, we discuss how our model might also be viewed as a model of counterfeiting.
4.1 By-weight circulation
Consider ￿rst the case where equilibrium in the economy is characterized as by-weight circu-
lation. In such an equilibrium, light coins are traded with probability one in all matches, i.e.,
v‘ = 1, and a light coin buys q‘ units of output. In contrast, from (18) and (19), heavy coins are
traded with probability less than one in uninformed matches, pu("H;zh) < 1, and the velocity
of heavy coins is given by
vh = ￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)pu("H;zh): (28)
From (18) and (19), the terms of trade are determined by the incentive-compatibility condition
for low buyers and the individual-rationality condition for sellers. From this, pu("H;zh) is
independent of the fraction of informed matches, ￿. Therefore, the velocity of money increases
with the level of recognizability, ￿, because heavy coins have a higher velocity in informed
matches.
The higher velocity associated with greater recognizability translates into higher aggregate
output and higher welfare. To see this, note from (26) that aggregate output is
Y = ￿[￿qh + (1 ￿ ￿)qu("H;zh)] + (1 ￿ ￿)q‘: (29)
According to (29), high buyers, who represent a fraction ￿ of all buyers, consume qh in informed
matches and qu("H;zh) in uninformed matches; low buyers consume q‘ in all matches. Because
23qu("H;zh) < qh, aggregate output will increase as coins become more recognizable, i.e., as ￿
increases.
From (27), society￿ s welfare is given by
W = ￿f￿zh + ￿￿"Hu(qh) + ￿(1 ￿ ￿)["Hu(qu
h) + (1 ￿ pu
h)zh]g
+(1 ￿ ￿)[￿z‘ + ￿"Lu(q‘)]: (30)
Equation (30) has the following interpretation: A high buyer produces zh units of output in
the ￿rst period in order to mint the heavy coin. In the second period, he consumes qh and
trades his coin with probability one in informed matches; he consumes qu
h and trades his coin
with probability pu
h in uninformed matches. A low buyer produces z‘ units of output in the
￿rst period in order to mint a light coin and always consumes q‘ in the second period. Whereas
the expected utility of a low buyer is independent of ￿, the expected utility of a high buyer
increases with ￿ because "Hu(qh) ￿ zh > "Hu(qu
h) ￿ pu
hzh. Hence, social welfare increases
with the recognizability of coins because, in order to separate themselves from buyers holding
light coins, buyers with heavy coins trade with a lower probability and buy less output in
uninformed matches. Consequently, as the recognizability of coins improves, both output and
welfare increase.
These results are summarized in
Proposition 11 Consider an equilibrium with circulation by weight. Output, welfare, and the
velocity of heavy coins all increase with ￿.
4.2 By-tale circulation
Consider now the case where the equilibrium is characterized as by-tale circulation. Recall
that there are multiple equilibria with by-tale circulation that di⁄er in the amount of out-
put produced in uninformed matches. Even when we restrict our attention to equilibria
where pu = 1, the output traded in an uninformed match can be anywhere between q‘ and
24 ￿1 [￿zh + (1 ￿ ￿)z‘].17 Here, we will focus on the equilibrium where coins are traded with
probability one in uninformed matches, pu = 1, and the participation constraint for the seller
binds,  (qu) = ￿zh+(1￿￿)z‘.18 Because all coins are traded with probability one, the velocity
of coins is not a⁄ected by a change in the recognizability; hence, v‘ = vh = 1 for all ￿. Aggregate
output is given by
Y = ￿￿qh + (1 ￿ ￿)￿q‘ + (1 ￿ ￿)qu: (31)
From the convexity of  (q), it is easy to check that ￿qh + (1 ￿ ￿)q‘ ￿ qu, where the inequality
is strict if   is strictly convex.19 Hence, as coins become more recognizable, aggregate output
actually falls. The reason is that the output traded in an uninformed match is larger than
the expected output in an informed match. So in contrast with what was obtained in the
equilibrium with circulation by weight, aggregate output does not increase as the recognizability
of the currency improves. This result, however, is not robust across all by-tale equilibria. For
example, a by-tale equilibrium with qu = q‘ can be sustained by the belief that any out-of-
equilibrium o⁄er in an uninformed match comes from a buyer holding a light coin. In such an
equilibrium, output, Y , increases with ￿.
When pu = 1 and  (qu) = ￿zh + (1 ￿ ￿)z‘, social welfare is measured by
￿￿1W = ￿f￿rzh + ￿["Hu(qh) ￿  (qh)] + (1 ￿ ￿)["Hu(qu) ￿  (qu)]g+
+(1 ￿ ￿)f￿rz‘ + ￿["Lu(q‘) ￿  (q‘)] + (1 ￿ ￿)["Lu(qu) ￿  (qu)]g: (32)
It can be shown that society￿ s welfare increases with ￿ (see the appendix). Even though ag-
gregate output can increase as the currency becomes less recognizable, social welfare will fall
because of misallocation of output between high and low buyers. In other words, the coins￿
17Recall that any q between q‘ and  
￿1 [￿zh + (1 ￿ ￿)z‘] can be sustained by the following belief: If a buyer
makes an o⁄er asking for more output than q, the seller believes that this o⁄er comes from a buyer holding a
light coin and will reject it.





￿1[￿zh + (1 ￿ ￿)z‘] ￿ ￿ 
￿1 (zh) + (1 ￿ ￿) 
￿1 (z‘):
25lack of recognizability implies that high and low buyers consume the same quantity of output
in uninformed matches, although e¢ ciency would dictate that high buyers consume more than
low buyers.
The above results are summarized in
Proposition 12 Consider an equilibrium with circulation by weight. Although an increase in
￿ increases welfare, it does not a⁄ect the velocity of coins and it can either increase or decrease
output.
Propositions 11 and 12 both capture the idea that there is a welfare gain associated with
making a currency more recognizable. The gains in welfare, however, arise for di⁄erent reasons.
In a by-weight equilibrium, social welfare increases with recognizability because the velocity of
the heavy coin increases. The low velocity of the heavy coin originates in high buyers￿need to
signal the quality of their coin by o⁄ering to consume less. In a by-tale equilibrium, there are
no signaling costs, because the equilibrium is pooling. The welfare gain from having a currency
that is more recognizable arises here from a better allocation of output among low and high
buyers: Buyers with a high marginal utility of consumption consume more, whereas buyers
with a low marginal utility of consumption consume less.
4.3 Gresham￿ s law
We know from propositions 9 and 10 that a reduction in the recognizability of coins triggers
a Gresham￿ s-law type of phenomenon. If "L=z‘ > "H=zh and ￿ < ￿c or if "L=z‘ < "H=zh and
￿ < ￿ ￿, then all buyers mint light coins, and heavy coins are driven out circulation. We now
want to assess the welfare consequences of a transition from a dual-currency to a single-currency
equilibrium.
Consider ￿rst the case where "L=z‘ > "H=zh, so that the equilibrium corresponds to circu-
lation by weight, provided that ￿ is su¢ ciently large. Low buyers trade z‘ for q‘ in both the
single- and dual-currency equilibria. Hence, the welfare of low buyers does not depend upon ￿.
The welfare of high buyers is, however, minimized when ￿ < ￿c. To see this, recall that high
26buyers always have the option of minting light coins in the ￿rst period of their lives. If they
choose to mint heavy coins, as they do when ￿ > ￿c, their welfare must be higher than what
they would obtain by minting light coins.
Consider next the case where "L=z‘ < "H=zh, so that the equilibrium corresponds to cir-
culation by tale, provided that ￿ is su¢ ciently large. If ￿ > ￿ ￿, then there is an equilibrium
with circulation by tale such that qu ￿ q‘. Thus low buyers are as well-o⁄ or worse-o⁄ at the
single-currency equilibrium compared to the dual-currency, by-tale equilibrium, because the
circulation of heterogenous coins allows low buyers to consume more than the intrinsic value of
their light coins in uninformed matches. In contrast, the welfare of high buyers is lower in the
single-currency equilibrium. To see this, consider an equilibrium where both high and light coins
are minted. A high buyer always has the option to mint light coins, in which case he consumes
q‘ in informed matches and qu ￿ q‘ in uninformed matches. In a single-currency equilibrium,
they would mint a light coin and consume q‘ in all matches. Consequently, high buyers have a
higher expected utility in the dual-currency equilibrium than in the single-currency equilibrium.
Proposition 13 A decrease in ￿ that triggers a transition from a dual-currency equilibrium to
a single-currency equilibrium is welfare-worsening in a Pareto sense.
A decrease in coins￿recognizability reduces welfare when it drives heavy coins out of circu-
lation. Heavy coins, which are useful to high buyers, may no longer be used if the asymmetries
of information are su¢ ciently severe.20
4.4 Counterfeiting
Propositions 11, 12, and 13 have all shown that coins￿imperfect recognizability imposes welfare
costs on society. One can make this point in a rather dramatic way by focusing on a limiting
case where the weight of the light coin approaches zero. One can interpret the situation where
20It should be noted that the above proposition does not imply that a dual coin arrangement is necessarily
better than an arrangement with a single coin. Indeed, the experiment that we have considered consists in taking
the denomination structure fz‘;zhg that is ideal in the absence of an information problem and seeing how, given
this denomination structure, the recognizability of coins a⁄ects welfare. Designing an optimal denomination
structure in the presence of asymmetric information is left for future investigation.
27z‘ ! 0 as one of counterfeiting, where the heavy coin is the ￿genuine currency￿and the light
coin is the counterfeit. The assumption that the weight of the light coin is almost zero captures
the idea that the marginal cost of producing counterfeit currency is close to zero.21
Assume "L=z‘ > "H=zh so that the equilibrium outcome has the potential to be separating.
The following proposition characterizes the terms of trade in uninformed matches:
Proposition 14 Assume "L=z‘ > "H=zh. As z‘ ! 0, both qu("H;zh) and qu("H;z‘) approach
0.
Proof. From (19), we have qu("L;z‘) ￿ qu("H;zh). But qu("L;z‘) = q‘ ! 0 as z‘ approaches
0.
According to Proposition 14, the quantities produced in uninformed matches tends to zero
as the intrinsic value of light coins tend to zero. In other words, if the light coin is almost
costless to produce, trade in uninformed meetings shuts down. The intuition for this result
is simple. The buyer with a genuine coin who wishes to separate himself from a buyer with
a counterfeit coin looks for an o⁄er that the buyer with a counterfeit coin does not want to
imitate. However, in a separating equilibrium, the utility of a buyer with a counterfeit coin is
almost zero. Therefore, the only o⁄er that a buyer with genuine coin can make is such that qu
is close to 0.
Proposition 14 has dramatic implications for the way the economy works. If ￿ > ￿c, then
buyers with high marginal utility of consumption mint heavy coins and trade only if they are
in informed meetings. As ￿ decreases, the number of meetings in which trades take place falls.
As ￿ falls below the threshold ￿c, high buyers have no incentive to mint heavy coins because
the probability that they can use them in a bilateral match is too small. As a consequence, the
entire economy shuts down.
21For a models of counterfeiting with ￿at currencies, see Kulti (1996), Green and Weber (1996), and Nosal
and Wallace (2004).
285 Conclusion
In this paper we have studied the e⁄ects of the imperfect recognizability of coins on output,
welfare and the velocity of money. We have developed a simple model in which heterogenous
buyers can trade with two di⁄erent coins, a light coin and a heavy one. The weights of the
coins correspond to their optimal weights in a world with complete information. The terms of
trade in bilateral matches are determined by take-it-or-leave-it o⁄ers by buyers, and we have
allowed the use of lotteries to overcome the indivisibility of coins. We have characterized the
di⁄erent types of equilibria that can emerge in the presence of asymmetric information. If
is it very di¢ cult to distinguish between light and heavy coins, then the equilibrium will be
characterized by a single coin, the light one. This outcome has a Gresham￿ s-law ￿ avor to it. If
the recognizability problem is not too severe, then both heavy and light coins will circulate. We
have established conditions under which equilibrium is separating in the sense that heavy and
light coins are always traded according to di⁄erent terms. In such equilibria, velocity, output,
and welfare increase with the recognizability of coins. Furthermore, as the weight of the light
coin tends to zero, so does the quantity traded in uninformed matches. Therefore, economic
activity shuts down when agents can counterfeit good coins at a negligible cost. In pooling or
by-tale equilibria, velocity and output do not necessarily increase with the recognizability of
coins, but welfare does.
Our model could be extended to characterize the optimal denomination structure of the
economy in the presence of incomplete information. In particular, one may wonder whether a
uniform currency is better than two currencies for overcoming the recognizability problem. Our
model could also be used to discuss issues related to counterfeiting and how di⁄erent policies
can prevent it. We leave these extensions to future research.
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32Appendix
A1. Proof of Lemma 5
Step 1: From (14), a low buyer with a light coin weakly prefers to trade with uninformed
sellers than with informed sellers. This means that
"Lu[qu("L;z‘)] ￿ pu("L;z‘)z‘ ￿ "Lu(q‘) ￿ z‘:
Consequently,
￿rz‘ + ￿f"Lu(q‘) ￿ z‘g + (1 ￿ ￿)f"Lu[qu("L;z‘)] ￿ pu("L;z‘)z‘g ￿
￿rz‘ + "Lu(q‘) ￿ z‘: (33)
Step 2: If information is complete, a low buyer prefers to hold a light coin than a heavy coin.
This means that
￿rz‘ + "Lu(q‘) ￿ z‘ > ￿rzh + "Lu(qh) ￿ zh: (34)
Step 3: From (14), a low buyer holding a heavy coin weakly prefers to trade with an informed
seller than with an uninformed one. It implies
￿rzh + "Lu(qh) ￿ zh ￿
￿rzh + ￿f"Lu(qh) ￿ zhg + (1 ￿ ￿)f"Lu[qu("L;zh)] ￿ pu("L;zh)zhg: (35)
From (33)￿ (35), we deduce that low-type buyers strictly prefer to hold light coins.
A2. Proof of Proposition 6
We ￿rst show that if "L=z‘ > "H=zh, then in any equilibrium where high buyers hold
heavy coins, [qu("H;zh);pu("H;zh)] 6= [qu("L;z‘);pu("L;z‘)]. This implies that there exists no
equilibrium with circulation by tale. The proof is diagrammatic. In ￿gure A.1, we denote Ub
ij
as the locus of points in (q;p)-space that generates the same surplus from the bargaining game
for an "i buyer, where i 2 fH;Lg, holding a coin of weight zj, where j 2 fh;‘g. The equation
for this indi⁄erence curve is
Ub
ij = "iu(q) ￿ pzj; 8(i;j) 2 fH;Lg ￿ fh;‘g:
33Similarly, Us
j denotes the indi⁄erence curve for a seller who believes that the buyer he is matched
with holds a coin of weight zj, where j 2 fh;‘g. The equation for this indi⁄erence curve is
Us
j = ￿ (q) + pzj; 8j 2 fh;‘g:
Consider an equilibrium where high buyers hold heavy coins and suppose that, contrary to
the claim made above, [qu("H;zh);pu("H;zh)] = [qu("L;z‘);pu("L;z‘)] = (qu;pu) in an unin-
formed meeting. We represent the equilibrium utility levels of a low buyer holding light coins
by Ub
L‘ and a high buyer holding heavy coin by Ub
Hh, when both buyers make the o⁄er (qu;pu)
in ￿gure A.1. (We also depict the utility that a high buyer can expect to receive if he deviates
from the proposed equilibrium of holding a heavy coin and, instead, chooses to hold a light coin














Figure A.1. No pooling equilibrium.
Because "L=z‘ > "H=zh, Ub
L‘ is steeper than Ub
Hh. Consider now the out-of-equilibrium
o⁄er (^ qu; ^ pu) made by some buyer (see ￿gure A.1). If such an o⁄er were accepted, it would
reduce the utility of any buyer holding a light coin compared to the utility associated with o⁄er
34(qu;pu); i.e., o⁄er (^ qu; ^ pu) is located to the left of the indi⁄erence curves Ub
L‘ and Ub
H‘. However,
o⁄er (^ qu; ^ pu) would increase the utility of a high buyer holding a heavy coin compared to the
utility associated with the proposed equilibrium o⁄er (qu;pu); i.e., o⁄er (^ qu; ^ pu) is located to
the right of the indi⁄erence curve Ub
Hh. Therefore, according to the Cho￿ Kreps criterion, the
seller should believe that o⁄er (^ qu; ^ pu) comes from a high buyer holding a heavy coin. Finally,
the o⁄er (^ qu; ^ pu) provides the seller with a payo⁄ that is greater than zero. To see this, note
￿rst that (qu;pu) is an acceptable o⁄er given the seller￿ s initial belief, ￿, that the high buyer is
holding a heavy coin. Therefore, (qu;pu) is located above the zero payo⁄ indi⁄erence curve of
the seller who believes that the buyer is holding a heavy coin, denoted by Us
h in ￿gure A.1. The
deviating o⁄er (^ qu; ^ pu) is also chosen to be located above the indi⁄erence curve of the seller who
believes that the buyer is holding a heavy coin, so that the seller will accept the o⁄er. Hence,
it is not possible to have an equilibrium in which the high buyer with a heavy coin and the low
buyer with a light coin make the same o⁄er.
We next show that if "L=z‘ < "H=zh, then in any equilibrium where high buyers hold heavy
coins,
[qu("H;zh);pu("H;zh)] = [qu("L;z‘);pu("L;z‘)] = (qu;pu):
Assume that [qu("H;zh);pu("H;zh)] 6= [qu("L;z‘);pu("L;z‘)]. Since low buyers are identi￿ed by
their o⁄ers, they propose the same terms of trade as those that prevail in informed matches,
i.e., [qu("L;z‘);pu("L;z‘)] = (q‘;1). The surplus of the low buyer is represented in ￿gure A.2












Figure A.2. No separating equilibrium.
Incentive compatibility requires that the o⁄er made by a high buyer be located in the shaded
area in ￿gure A.2, where Ub
Hh is the indi⁄erence curve of a high buyer holding a heavy coin
who makes the o⁄er (q‘;1). It is easy to see that any o⁄er [not equal to (q‘;1)] in the shaded
area￿ e.g., (^ q; ^ p)￿ provides a lower payo⁄ to the high buyer than the payo⁄ associated with
o⁄er (q‘;1). In ￿gure A.2, ^ Ub
Hh < Ub
Hh; hence, there cannot exist a by-weight (separating)
equilibrium.
A3. Proof of Lemma 7
Consider ￿rst the equilibrium o⁄er in an uninformed match of a low buyer holding a light
coins, [qu("L;z‘);pu("L;z‘)]. Since from proposition 6 a buyer reveals his type through his
o⁄er, ￿[qu("L;z‘);pu("L;z‘)] = 0. Therefore, a low buyer holding a light coin can do no better
than making an o⁄er that assumes that the seller can observe the coin he is holding, i.e.,
[qu("L;z‘);pu("L;z‘)] = (q‘;1).
Let us turn to the equilibrium o⁄er in an uninformed match of a high buyer holding a heavy
coin, [qu("H;zh);pu("H;zh)]. Since equilibrium is separating, ￿[qu("H;zh), pu("H;zh)] = 1. An
o⁄er cannot violate (18), otherwise, it would be rejected by a seller; nor can it violate (19);
36otherwise, low buyers would have an incentive to deviate from their equilibrium o⁄er. If the
equilibrium o⁄er did not maximize the utility of a high buyer holding a heavy coin in (17)
subject to (18) and (19), then one could construct a pro￿table deviation, as in the proof of
proposition 6.
Consider next the o⁄er of a high buyer who deviates in the ￿rst period by minting a light
coin, [qu("H;z‘);pu("H;z‘)]. Any acceptable o⁄er must satisfy (19); otherwise, the low buyer
holding the light coin would have a pro￿table deviation. Since the indi⁄erence curve Ub
H‘ is
steeper than indi⁄erence curve Ub
L‘, a high buyer holding the light coin can do no better than
o⁄ering [qu("L;z‘);1], as in ￿gure 3. Hence, a high buyer has no incentive to mint a light coin.
Finally, consider next the o⁄er of a low buyer who deviates in the ￿rst period by mint-
ing a heavy coin, [qu("L;zh);pu("L;zh)]. Since the indi⁄erence curve Ub
Hh is steeper than
indi⁄erence curve Ub
Lh, a low buyer holding a heavy coin cannot do better than o⁄ering
[qu("H;zh);pu("H;zh)] because otherwise the participation constraint of the seller would be
violated, see ￿gure 3. Hence, a low buyer has no incentive to mint a heavy coin.
A4. Proof of Lemma 8
In equilibrium, all buyers hold light coins. Consequently, buyers cannot do better than the
o⁄er they would make in an informed match, namely, (q‘;1).
Consider next the o⁄er of a high buyer who deviates and mints a heavy coin. This o⁄er,
[qu("H;zh);pu("H;zh)], must satisfy (19), so that a low buyer with a light coin has no incentive
to deviate from his equilibrium o⁄er, and it must also satisfy the seller￿ s participation constraint
(18). In ￿gure A.3, the o⁄er [qu("H;zh);pu("H;zh)] must be located on or to the left of Ub
L‘. As
well, high buyer with a light coin must not have an incentive to deviate from his equilibrium
o⁄er by proposing [qu("H;zh);pu("H;zh)]. In ￿gure A.3, the o⁄er must be located on or to the
left of Ub
H‘. Also, any such o⁄er must satisfy the participation constraint of the seller under the
















Figure A.3. Single currency equilibrium.
One can use the same reasoning as in lemma 7 to show that the o⁄er [qu("L;zh);pu("L;zh)]
satis￿es (18)￿ (19), and the best deviating o⁄er is given by (qu
h;pu
h) in ￿gure A.3. Hence, the
high buyer will have no incentive to mint the heavy coin. The same reasoning applies to a low
buyer who deviates and mints a heavy coin, i.e., the best deviating o⁄er is given by (qu
h;pu
h).
A5. Proof of Proposition 12
We show that social welfare increases with ￿. Here we will denote arbitrary weights for light




￿r~ zh + ￿
￿
"Hu( ￿1 (~ zh)) ￿ ~ zh
￿





￿r~ z‘ + ￿
￿
"Lu( ￿1 (~ z‘)) ￿ ~ z‘
￿
+ (1 ￿ ￿)["Lu(qu) ￿  (qu)]
￿
:
38Grouping all the terms in ￿ and (1 ￿ ￿), we obtain
￿￿1Wtale = ￿
￿










￿(1 + r)[￿~ zh + (1 ￿ ￿)~ z‘] + [￿"H + (1 ￿ ￿)"L]u
￿
 ￿1 [￿~ zh + (1 ￿ ￿)~ z‘]
￿￿
: (36)
We want to establish that









￿(1 + r)[￿~ zh + (1 ￿ ￿)~ z‘] + [￿"H + (1 ￿ ￿)"L]u
￿
 ￿1 [￿~ zh + (1 ￿ ￿)~ z‘]
￿
: (37)













s.t. ￿zh + (1 ￿ ￿)z‘ = ￿~ zh + (1 ￿ ￿)~ z‘: (39)
Note that the value of the objective function corresponds to the left-hand side of (37) when
(zh;z‘) = (~ zh; ~ z‘) and it corresponds to the right-hand side of (37) when zh = z‘ = ￿~ zh+(1￿￿)~ z‘.














Therefore, (zh;z‘) = (~ zh; ~ z‘) maximizes (38) and, as a consequence, (37) holds. Therefore, Wtale
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